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SUMMARY 
The aim of this paper is to study and analyse railway industry structures in some European countries 
and, on the basis of the analysis, form some basic forms of railway industry organisation. 
Furthermore, this paper aims to seek suitable alternatives for capital investment financing. It is 
assumed that industry organisation, legislation and present state-of-the-art practices largely dictate 
the financing arrangements available. 
ln  the United Kingdom, railway industry has been privatised into smaller entities. Infrastructure 
operations, traffic operations and related service operations (eg engineering services and rolling 
stock leasing) are sold as independent companies to private investors. Even the owner of rail 
infrastructure has been privatised completely. In Sweden and Finland, traffic operations and 
infrastructure have been separated. The state still owns the traffic operator (both operators are state 
owned limited companies), which in practice hold a monopoly in the market. The owner of the 
infrastructure is a state rail authority. In Norway, railways are still public-owned, being quite a 
contrast to the arrangements in the UK. 
The theoretical models of industry organisation may be constructed with the help of value-
chain/line-of-business -matrixes. Each value chain link in each line-of-business represents a function 
which can be privatised if considered worthwhile. In the example countries, the value chains have 
been unbundled while the horizontal integration has remained. In principle, there should be no 
theoretical obstacles to unbundle the business vertically as well, provided that the railway market 
functions efficiently. Efficient market means a) several competitors in all sectors of the market b) 
minimum state intrusion and foremost c) that there is true market potential, ie that the market is large 
enough. 
ln  the UK, the infrastructure investments are financed by a private infrastructure owner, Railtrack. 
The investments are recovered from train operating companies in the form of access charges. Major 
products may include Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)  type arrangements. In all Nordic countries, 
infrastructure investments are financed through state budget. In Norway and Sweden, some  BOT- 
projects are under planning phase, while in Finland the discussion is about to begin. 
There are no major obstacles for the employment of private capital in rail infrastructure investments 
in Finland. This could be done either by project company arrangements (that is,  BOT-model) or by 
special arrangements where VR  (former State Railways) possibly together with other investors 
directly finance the investment. The former model guarantees transparency as far as economical 
aspects are concerned. Furthermore, BOT-arrangement would enable fair competition between 
potential project promoters who are willing to finance, build and operate the line. The latter model is 
probably easier to implement, at least in the short term. However, numerous variants and 
possibilities are available for the financing of infrastructure investments. 
Political and socio-economic viewpoints must be considered carefully when alternative financing 
methods are evaluated. Politicians and authorities would probably fell more comfortable if a clear 
financing strategy, as a part of national traffic policy, for rail investments existed. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the potential railway market extends over the eastern borders of 
Finland. Know-how of financing arrangements will provide a competitive edge in the international 
competition of building and operating new rails. 
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TI! VISTELMÄ  
Tämä tutkimus kuvailee rautatieliikenteen toimialarakennetta Isossa-Britanniassa, Ruotsissa, Nor-
jassa ja Suomessa. Toimialarakenteen tutkimisen motiivina  on etsiä erilaisia vaihtoehtoja infrastruk-
tuurin pääomainvestointien rahoitukselle, johon toimialan rakenteella  on ratkaiseva merkitys. Lisäksi 
lainsäädännölliset, organisatoriset  ja totutut menettelytavat vaikuttavat rahoitusvaihtoehtojen 
muotoutumiseen. 
Isossa-Britanniassa rautatieliikenne on täysin yksityistetty ja palveluketjujen osat on pilkottu osiin. 
Toimintoja on yksityistetty myös alueellisesti jaotellen. Infrastruktuuriin liittyvät toiminnot, liiken-
nöinti ja erilaiset palvelu- ja tukitoiminnot (esimerkiksi radansuunnittelu ja kalustonvuokraus) on 
 myyty yksityisille sijoittajille omina yhtiöinään. Jopa infrastruktuuriomaisuus  on yksityistetty. Suo-
messa ja Ruotsissa infrastruktuurin omistus  ja liikennöinti on erotettu toisistaan. Molemmissa maissa 
 valtio  kuitenkin omistaa edelleen kansallisen rautatieyrityksen. Ratainfrastruktuurin omistaa valtion 
virasto. Norjassa valtio sekä omistaa infrastruktuurin että harjoittaa liikennöintiä  ja toimialan raken-
ne oli perinteinen valtiojohtoinen virasto  tai liikelaitos ennen vuoden 1996 lopulla toteutettua uudis-
tusta. 
Toimialarakennetta kuvattaessa voidaan käyttää matriisia, jossa jalostus-/palveluketjun osat ja liike-
toiminta-alueet on eroteltu. Ketjujen osista ja liiketoiminta-alueista voidaan haluttaessa muodostaa 
itsenäisiä toimintoja, jotka voidaan edelleen yksityistää. Tutkituissa maissa yksityistäminen  on ta-
pahtunut nimenomaan jalostusketjujen kautta ja liiketoiminta-alueet on säilytetty ennallaan. Osaltaan 
tähän vaikuttaa asiakassegmenttipohjainen liiketoiminta-aluejaottelu, jota tässä tutkimuksessa sovel-
lettiin. Teoriassa yksityistäminen voidaan tehdä toisinkin,  jos markkinat toimivat hyvin.  Ns. tehok-
kaat markkinat ovat olemassa  jos a) toimialalla on useita kilpailijoita, b) valtio ei säätele markkinoita 
 ja  c) markkinat ovat riittävän suuret, toisin sanoen kysyntä  on riittävä. 
Isossa-Britanniassa infrastruktuurin pääomainvestoinnit rahoittaa Railtrack  Ltd, joka omistaa rata- 
verkon, Investoinnit kuoletetaan liikennöitsijöiltä perittävällä ratamaksulla. Joissakin suurissa hank-
keissa voidaan soveltaa BOT-tyyppisiä järjestelyjä (BOT = Build-Operate-Transfer), joissa raken-
netulle rataosuudelle taataan rahoittavalle konsortiolle yksinoikeus harjoittaa liikennettä. 
Pohjoismaissa rataverkon pääomainvestoinnit rahoitetaan valtion budjetista. Norjassa  ja Ruotsissa 
onjo kokeiltu BOT-hankkeita. Suomessa asiasta  on käyty alustavaa julkista keskustelua. 
Yksityistä pääomaa voidaan käyttää ratainvestointeihin myös Suomessa - mitään periaatteellista. yli-
voimaista estettä ei ole olemassa. Yksityistä pääomaa voidaan käyttää esimerkiksi muodostamalla 
erillinen rakennus- ja liikennöintiyhtiö, projektiyhtiö,  joka rahoittaa, rakentaa ja liikennöi rata- 
osuutta. Toinen vaihtoehto  on se, että VR Osakeyhtiölle annetaan erillisjärjestelyin oikeus rahoittaa 
 ja  rakentaa rata, jonka liikennöintiin VR säilyttää yksinoikeuden. VR voi toimia hankkeessa joko yk-
sin tai yhteistyössä muiden yksityisten tai julkisten (esimerkiksi kunnat ja kaupungit) sijoittajien 
kanssa. Edellinen vaihtoehto, projektiyhtiö, takaa rahoituksellisen  ja taloudellisen transparenssin ja 
 mandollistaa lisäksi kilpailuttamisen toimiluvasta asianomaisella rataosuudella. Jälkimmäinen tapa 
 on  luultavasti helpompi toteuttaa käytännössä. 
Eri vaihtoehtoja punnittaessa törmätään väistämättä poliittisiin  ja ideologisiin kysymyksiin ja niistä 
tulisikin keskustella, jotta ymmärrettäisiin millaisia seuraamuksia eri vaihtoehdoilla saattaa olla. Po-
liitikkojen ja viranomaisten tehtävänä onkin määritellä periaatteet  ja strategiat, joilla pää-
omainvestointeja tulevaisuudessa voidaan tehdä. 
Eri rahoitusmuotojen hallinta saattaa olla tärkeä kilpailuetu kilpailtaessa esimerkiksi Itä-Euroopan 
infrastruktuurihankkeista. Ilman kotimaista kokemusta tätä kilpailuetua ei voi syntyä. 
FOREWORD 
This study attempts to c1arif' the concepts and models of private financing of railways. 
The study includes examples on railway industry structures in UK and some Nordic 
countries. 
The study has been prepared by Mr.  Pekka Leviäkangas, Licentiate of Technology. 
Helsinki, November 1997 
Finnish Rail Administration 
Strategy Unit 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 	Organising and Contracting Privately Financed Projects 
Many forms of organisational and contractual arrangements are available for privately 
financed infrastructure projects. The problem is not to find examples of these arrange-
ments but to select the one that best  - or at least, well - meets the needs of different 
parties involved in a project. These parties, whose goals and needs differ from each 
other, include 
- 	the ultimate owner of the project, ie government or its representative 
organisations 
- 	the project investors, both equity and debt investors, and the guarantors  
- 	project contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers  
- 	operators of the facility, who play an important role in the rail sector  
- 	the final users of the services provided by the completed project. 
While practically an infinite number of alternatives exist for organising, financing and 
contracting a privately financed project, some popular base cases have arisen. Table 
1-1 introduces some of these cases and their basic characteristics. It is obvious that 
the presentation is far from exhaustive and is more of a list of examples. 
The key word in the context of financial and contractual arrangements is risk. The aim 
of these arrangements is to allocate risks involved in a project in such a manner that 
the financiers receive an adequate return on their investment, while maintaining the 
prices on a reasonable level from the viewpoint of the government. Risk-return trade-
off is one of the fundamental concepts of financial theory: the riskier the asset, the 
higher is the required rate of return on it. If the risks are too high for private investors, 
this will lead to higher pricing of services, and the society will suffer a welfare loss as 
the benefits of the services will not cover the prices paid for them. Private investors, 
both equity and debt investors, evaluate very carefully their risk position in each pro-
ject and set the rate of return at an adequate level. Thus, it is in the interest of the 
government organisation that represents the whole society to create an investment 
opportunity for private investors which investors feel comfortable enough about so 
that their risk premiums are set at a level which does not impair the social net benefits 
of the project.  
ln Finland, the liberalisation of railways has created a new situation in the rail trans-
port market. The former State Railways Authority  (yR, Valtion Rautatiet) has been di-
vided into two entities: 1) the Finnish Railway Administration  (RHK) that has adopted 
the public authority responsibilities and is the owner of the rail infrastructure, and 2) 
 VR  limited company that operates the rail equipment on a business basis. The State 
of Finland is still the owner of VR company. The ownership of the rail infrastructure re-
mains in the hands of RHK which also maintains the rail network and is responsible 
for capital investments as well. However, first proposals for construction of new rails 
by VR and other investors have been introduced.  
ln the road sector, a similar pattern of re-organisation is expected to take place within 
a few years. The Finnish National Road Administration has already been divided into 
a business unit that plans, constructs and maintains roads, and an administrative part, 
which takes care of the duties of public authority and manages and owns the 
infrastructure.  
Table 1-1. Alternative Organisafional and Contractual Arrangements in Capital Invest-
ment Financing 
Type of Description Applications on 
Arrangement ___________________________________________ _____________________________________  
Public enterprise A public, state-owned enterprise takes care of the For example in France and Spain on toll mo- 
financing and realisation of the project, and receives torways, where publicly owned toll 	corn- 
compensation from the users of the service or from panies receive toll revenues from road users. 
the government; it is possible that the public enter- ln Finland and Sweden, state-owned rail op- 
prise tenders out the construction and operating con- erating companies collect ticket charges from 
tracts or potential concessionaires. -passengers in order to finance their operating 
activities, but they do not participate at the 
moment in the financing of the capital invest- 
ments in infrastructure. 
Public-Private An 	arrangement where 	public 	capital 	is 	supple- Applied in the United States, for example in 
Partnerships 1 mented by private contributors, who will benefit from connection with highway and rail construction 
the project. The contribution may be voluntary when projects. 
speculational development is involved in the project 
and compulsory eg in the form of access fees, con- 
struction permit fees, extra zone taxes, etc. 
Franchising The government grants the franchisee a right to op- Applied in the UK in railway sector. 	The 
erate a particular 	transport function, eg rail passen- Franchising Director (FD) makes a franchis - 
ger traffic on a particular route or region. Franchisee  ing agreement with the franchisee 	who will 
pays a charge to the grantor according to the fran- operate a particular rail line. 	ln addition to 
chise contract (or possibly vice versa in case of bad franchise payments to the FD, the train oper- 
economic outcome). Franchisee is given the right to ating company pays an access charge for the 
operate the business in question. use 	of the 	rail 	infrastructure to 	Railtrack, 
which in turn owns the infrastructure. 
Build-Operate The government tenders out the concession con- All over the world in transport infrastructure, 
-Transfer tracts 	and 	the 	concessionaire 	builds 	the 	facility, power generating facilities, telecommunica- 
concessions operates it until the investment has been recovered tions and other infrastructure, such as water  
(BOT) (by user charges or shadow charges paid by the gov- supply, oil pipelines, etc. Some impressive 
ernment) with interest by both the equity and debt in- mega-project packages have been carried 
vestors, 	and 	finally transfers 	the 	facility 	back to out with 	BOT principles, eg Hong Kong's 
public ownership. Chek Lap Kok airport with its other transport 
connections. 
Build-Own As with BOT arrangement excluding the transfer of As with BOT but perhaps not so extensively 
-Operate the facility. The facility remains in private ownership popular. 
concessions through franchise agreement for an indefinite period 
(BOO) of time. 
Build-Own-Operate- Essentially the same as BOT. As BOT. 
Transfer 
concessions 
(BOOT) _____________________________________ ________________________________  
Design-Build The British version of BOT with essentially the same Applied in the UK in road projects; the gov- 
-Finance-Operate principles. Compare: Design-Build-Operate contracts ernment pays a shadow toll according to traf- 
contracts that are also used. fic volumes. 
(DBFO) _____________________________________ ________________________________  
1 	Public in this context refers to either state or regional/local authority involvement, ie public 
capital is eventually taxpayer money. Private capital is naturally the money of firms, banks and 
other similar institutions that usually operate on a commercial basis. 
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Also at EU level, the policy of the Commission is to improve the efficiency and quality 
of service by transforming railway services into businesses controlled by the market, 
ie to pnvatise rail traffic operations1 . As far as capital investments are concerned, the 
White Paper of the Commission proposes  public/private partnerships for financing 
such investments, but lacks any specific models of how the investments are to be ac-
tually arranged financially. The basic idea, which can be read between the lines of the 
White Paper, that the infrastructure management includes capital investments as well 
and they are to be financed through access charges from the operators. The White 
Paper merely states as follows: 
'The Commission will study further principles for infrastructure charging and capacity 
allocation, and will in due course make proposals." 
One can conclude that at present the project financing issue has to be solved in each 
case individually depending on each state's existing organisation and legislation. Evid-
ently, the harmonisation within EU will result in some common practices and models. 
Hence, the financing issue will also adopt some common features, and a more open 
market will be available for project investors. 
1.2 	The Purpose of This Paper 
The purpose of this paper is 
to describe the structures of railway industries in the UK, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland 
- 	secondly, to develop a conceptual analysis framework for different types of 
organisational, financial and contractual arrangements within rail industry  
- 	thirdly, to study capital investment financing arrangements available within 
each industry structure; as organisational issues cannot be separated from 
financing issues they have to be simultaneously dealt with  
- 	finally, to perform an analysis in the Finnish operating environment, where 
existing organisations, legislation and responsibilities of authorities dictate 
which forms of arrangements are desirable and applicable. 
The results are a product of a qualitative analysis and therefore extremely general in 
nature. Each project and operation needs to be analysed individually if a functional ar-
rangement is pursued. It should be emphasised that the goal is to describe private 
financing on a project level, ie how to organise, finance and implement a capital 
investment, not the process or sub-processes of pnvatisation as a whole. However, it 
is obvious that the chosen model of pnvatisation affects the eventual financing altern-
atives that are applicable for rail projects. 
This paper is only a starting point for the inevitable discussion of rail project financing 
alternatives in Finland. The models and alternative arrangements presented in this pa-
per need to be modified and examined in more detail when practical solutions are 
sought. ln the road sector, the first privately financed motorway is currently under ten-
dering process. 
Commission of the European Communities: White Paper. A strategy for revitalising the Commun-
itys railways. Brussels 1996. 
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2 	METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
D 	Elements of the Analysis 
The analysis is divided into three elements. Each are presented in an identical frame-
work in order to clarify the comparisons between alternative approaches. These ele-
ments are 
- 	organisation of the railway industry describing briefly the responsibilities 
and degrees of freedom of the parties involved 
- 	capital investment financing, arrangements, ie how .the capital investments 
are financed, organised and carried out 
- 	evaluation of the risks that are borne by different parties concerning the 
profitability of the investment. 
D 	Organisation 
The value chain methodology is adopted here. This methodology is described in many 
strategic management textbooks, but was first introduced by McKinsey & Co 1 . The 
analysis is compressed in a framework presented by Rennicke 2 . First, Rennicke lists 
the value chain "links" of railway business as follows: 
Operations: 
Stations, terminals Train Crew Traffic Management 
(including related land (including traffic control, 
properties) signalling and detailed 
track allocation) 
Traction and Rolling Stock: 
Design and Engineering Maintenance 	Equipment Distribution Ownership 
Support Services: 
Customer Account Marketing, pricing and sales New Service 
Control Development 
Infrastructure and Property Related to Tracks: 
Design and Engineering Maintenance 	Construction Ownership 
Note the difference between land property related to stations and terminals and land 
property under the tracks. Note also that traffic management is understood in its 
broader meaning. 
See eg: Porter M: Competitive Advantage - Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. 
Any industry or business may be divided into five basic functions: 1) input logistics 2) operations 
3) output logistics 4) marketing and sales 5) after sales and maintenance services. These functions form 
the value chain. 
2 	Rennicke WJ: Private sector participation in railway activities. Rail International, 12/1996, pp 
26-29. 
Secondly, primary businesses and services can be divided into the following catego-
ries (business sectors or lines of businesses): 
Intercity Passenger: 
Train Operations 	Ticketing 	Information Services 	Stations 
Commuter: 
Train Operations 	Ticketing 	Information Services 	Stations 
Wagonload Freight:  
Linehaul 	 Bulk Transload 
Combined Transport: 
Pickup and Delivery 	 Terminal 	 Information Services 
A matrix presentation can now be drawn showing the vertical and horizontal integra-
tion (or disintegration, for that matter) of operations. An example is presented in table 
2-1. Traditionally, state owned railways have been fully integrated in both horizontal 
and vertical directions. 
Table 2-1. 
Line-of-business 
Value Chain Link 
Intercity 
Passenger 
Commuter 
______________ 
Wagonload Freight 
_________________  
Combined 
Transport 
Operations Stations, Terminals 
Traffic Management Vertical integration  ______________ _________________ _____________  
Train Crew 
Traction 	and Design and Engineering ________________  
Rolling Stock Fleet Distribution 
Maintenance  Hori:o,ri 
_____________ Ownership 
Support Customer Account Control 
Services Marketing, Pricing and Sales 
New Service Development 
Infrastructure Design and Engineering 
and Property Maintenance 
Construction 
Ownership _________________  
As the analysis proceeds, each organisation chart is followed by the matrix showing 
the strategy on which the organisation of the industry is based. The organisational 
units are placed in the matrix in their proper cell. 
The practices followed in capital investments in infrastructure are described also by a 
matrix showing the flows of capital, cash, and real assets as these transactions take 
place within the industry organisation. The presentation is extended beyond mere in-
vestment financing since a useful picture of the financial flows between the protagon-
ists is achieved, thus serving other analyses as well. The financial flows and contrac-
tual relations are given in appendices.  
lo 
D 	Investment Financing 
The investment financing question is discussed in la ittle more detail describing the 
state-of-the-art practices in a particular country and organisation. 
Li 	Risk Characteristics 
Finally, after the financial flows have been described, the risks of different parties are 
summarised and evaluated. Hedging possibilities and arrangements are discussed 
briefly. 
The risks involved in a privately financed infrastructure capital investment project may 
be classified according to uncertainties that relate to either 1) receiving an expected 
benefit or cash flow, or 2) investment cost or costs of operating the facility. Deficit or 
surplus in these items affects the profitability of the investment and the profitability of 
different operations. Some risks appear to be critical while others are more trivial. 
However, the organisational and contractual framework allocating the risks between 
parties involved determines the significance of each risk from different viewpoints. 
The risks may be listed in their economical context as follows:  
- 	investment cost risk 
interest rate risk; cost of debt capital 
foreign exchange rate risk in case of foreign investors 
operating cost risk; inflation 
- 	demand risk; revenues from operation (from users of the service or as 
shadow charges from the government)  
- 	risks related to government policy changes; taxation  (eg corporate tax, fuel 
tax, environmental taxes, etc.)  
- 	risks related to technical implementation and operation of the project  - eg 
time delays in construction or closing down the facility in case of accidents, 
etc. - which causes a disturbance in operating revenues even if demand 
factors remain unaltered. 
These are the fundamental financial risks (in the end, technical risks always transform 
into financial risks) that can be transferred and allocated in various manners depend-
ing on the contractual arrangements applied in each case. Equity holdings arrange-
ments also affect the behaviour and risks of different parties. For instance, if project 
contractors and suppliers are also the equity investors of the project company, they 
have an incentive to complete their contracts economically and efficiently in order to 
guarantee a successful starting point for their investment, ie the project. Debt finan-
ciers are similarly interested in ensuring a successful implementation and operation of 
the project as they face the risk of losing some of their investment in case of 
bankruptcy. 
From a purely theoretical viewpoint, greater risks also offer possibilities of greater re-
turns, as the variance of return usually increases when the other variables' variance 
increase. However, investors are traditionally considered to be risk averse in their 
behaviour. 
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3 	ORGANISATIONAL AND CONTRACTUAL ARRANGE- 
MENTS APPLIED IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
3.1 	The United Kingdom 
D 	Organisation 1 
The industrial structure of the British railways after the restructuring and  pnvatisation 
 of British Rail in 1992 includes the following parties and organisations:  
• 	Railtrack, which is the new responsible infrastructure authority. It owns 
and operates the track and the associated infrastructure  (eg signalling). It 
also owns most of the stations and depots; there are some Independent 
Stations that are usually large, high volume facilities, and Independent De-
pots. Railtrack plans access to the network and manages the rail traffic. 
Operators are granted an access to the network through an access agree-
ment with Railtrack. Railtrack is also the lessor of stations and depots it 
owns. Railtrack is responsible for the planning and securing of investments 
in the infrastructure. Railtrack was completely owned by the government 
but has now (1996) been privatised. 
Franchise operators, who provide the passenger transport services by 
competing over the franchise contracts. Until the franchise is granted to a 
private operator, the train operating company (TOC) is a subsidiary of 
British Rail. At the end of 1995, there were 25 TOCs that operated differ-
ent passenger lines. TOCs have organised themselves as an association 
to take care of common interests. At present, the minimum franchise pe-
riod is seven years. Longer periods may be tendered by the competing 
operators. 
• 	ROSCOs, which own or lease the majority of the rolling stock previously 
owned by British Rail. ROSCO leases out the rolling stock and provides 
heavy maintenance services to TOCs. By now, all three ROSCOs have 
been sold to private investors. (Spare parts supply and services are also 
organised as independent enterprises SPARESCO and RAILPART).  
Freight operators, who provide goods transport services and are likewise 
granted an access to the network by Railtrack. Freight transport operations 
were sold directly to the private investors by British Rail / Her Majesty's 
Government. Different lines-of-businesses were sold as separate pack-
ages (domestic bulk transport, domestic parcel services, international 
transports, etc.). 
Infrastructure maintenance and track renewal units, that have been 
partly sold to private investors the rest being for sale. By March 1996, six 
of British Rail's thirteen infrastructure and maintenance units had been 
sold. 
• 	Design and engineering units, that have been privatised (all seven de- 
sign offices). 
Sources: 1) Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF): Passenger Rail Industry Overview. 
September 1995. 2) OPRAF: Passenger Rail Industry Overview. Supplement March 1996. 
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• 	British Rail (BR), that continues to exist and operates those businesses 
not yet sold to private investors and those operations for which there is no 
market, eg non-operational land property and buildings.  
• 	Franchising Director, who is a statutory officer established in order to 
take responsibility of negotiation and awarding of rail franchises to li-
censed operators on the basis of competitive tendering. It also monitors 
the franchisee's performance. The Franchising Director receives payments 
from operators on profitable franchises and subsides non-profitable lines 
under the franchise agreement when necessary.  
• 	Rail Regulator, that functions under the Railways Act and assumes the 
following responsibilities: a) granting of licences and enforcing compliance 
with their terms, b) regulating access to track, stations and depots and en-
forcing domestic competition law in relation to railway services. 
The organisation of the British railway industry is shown in figure 3-1.  
nfrastructure owner1 	 I  Pubhc interest 
Contract 
	
LicenceJ 	Regulator 
Railtrack 	I 	I fee 	I 
Track access I 	I Access charges 
and depot least 	Depot/ease  
payments 
Transport service 	
ch,se 	
PUblIc IntereSt 
Train Operating Company 	
chise TOC enj 	
Director 
Passenger/Freight 
payment 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure 
Construction & 
 Maintenance  &
Engineering 
Businesses 
Rolling stock  
Roscos 
Equipment 
lease 
Lease 
Ticket 
and 
service 
fees 
(Sales 
revenues) 
Transport 
services 
Customers 
Consumers 
Figure 3-1. The British Railway Industry. Note the private infrastructure owner and the 
role of ROSCOs. Also note the mies of public authorities. 
Table 3-1 shows the organisational arrangements in a value -chain/line-of-business 
-matrix. It is observed how the vertical integration that previously dominated British 
Rail has been transformed into more concentrated, horizontally integrated businesses.  
13 
The financial and contractual relations are also shown in the form of a robust matrix in 
appendix 1. 
Table 3-1. UK Railway Industry. Value -chain/Line-of-business matrix 
Line-of-business 
Value Chain Link 
Intercity Passenger Commuter Wagonload Freight 
Operations Stations, Terminals 
______________________ 
TOCs 
________________ 
TOCs 
 Independent stations 
________________ 
Freight companies 1 
(private) 
Freight companies  
(BR) 
Traffic Management Railtrack Railtrack Railtrack 
Train Crew TOCs TOCs Freight companies 
Traction 	and Design and Engineering Private businesses Private businesses Private businesses 
Rolling Stock Maintenance ROSCOs ROSCOs ROSCOs 
___________ Ownership ROSCOs ROSCOs ROSCOs 
Support 
Services 
Customer Account Control  TOCs TOCs Freight companies 
Marketing, Pricing and Sales  TOCs TOCs Freight companies 
New Service Development  TOCs TOCs Freight companies 
Infrastructure 
and Property 
Design and Engineering Private businesses2 Private businesses Private businesses 
Maintenance Private businesses Private businesses Private businesses 
Construction Private businesses Private businesses Private businesses  
_______________ Ownership Railtrack Railtrack Railtrack 
1 	It is possible that Freight company  = TOC in a particular line 
2 	AlI the private businesses in engineering, construction and maintenance include ex- 
British Rail units 
Li 	Investment Financing 
For capital investments the basic principle is clear. Railtrack acts as an investor in new 
infrastructure. The primary method of financing a capacity extension or a new link in-
vestment is by access charges received by Railtrack. Railtrack is entitled to receive an 
adequate return on its investment, It is obvious, since  Railtrack owns and operates 
the infrastructure, that Railtrack has an incentive to "extend" its markets and make the 
infrastructure more lucrative to operating companies.  Railtrack can also utilise its com-
mercial freedom in raising funds from external sources. For example, a capital project 
could be financed by Railtrack's and Operator's equity infusion added with necessary 
debt capital raised from private capital market.  ln addition, Railtrack can utilise the 
same off-balance-sheet financing arrangements as any other private firm. Neverthe-
less, special arrangements are required without exception in large capital projects. 
The Regulator is concerned with major capital investments in the sense that it gives its 
approval to special arrangements,  eg major BOT projects. Exclusive rights for the use 
of infrastructure, as it is with  BOT projects, are possible provided that financial trans-
parency is ensured, and that concession contracts or other exclusive rights guaran-
teeing arrangements are prepared on a fair basis. The Rail Regulator adopts the 
public benefit view much in the same way as the Franchising Director and is the li-
cence grantor in these cases as well. Hence, it may influence the investment plans 
prepared mainly by Railtrack. 
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D 	Risks 
Typical capital investment risks can be summarised and allocated according to table 
3-2: 
Table 3-2. 
Typical Risk Allocation in Rail Infrastructure Capital Projects in the UK 
Risk Party Risk-Return Trade-offs and Hedging Options 
Investment cost Railtrack (Railtrack may try to increase access charges, but faces then demand risk.)  
Railtrack can cover investment cost risk by fixed-priced contracts and thus 
transfer the risk to the contractor. 
Interest 	rate 	(cost 	of Railtrack (Railtrack may increase access charges, but faces then demand risk.)  Railtrack 
debt) has an incentive to attach the interest rate on debt to long-term market-based 
interest rates to smooth the fluctuations of rates.  ln any case, financiers are 
most likely to use floating rates added with premiums. Numerous alternatives 
exist for hedging against changing interest rates. For example, a forward con - 
tract 1 may be agreed upon between financiers and Railtrack. 
Foreign exchange rate  Railtrack (Railtrack may increase access charges at the risk of decreasing demand.) 
(if 	foreign 	capital 	is Hedging may be done with instruments like forward contracts (see above) or 
employed) swap contracts2 . 
Operating cost Operator Basically there are two things a TOC can do to handle risks. First, it can try to  
(TOC) negotiate as favourable a franchise agreement with the Franchising Director 
(FD) as possible. This includes negotiation concerning government subsidies.  
____________________ __________ Secondly, TOC may try to renegotiate ticket pricing principles initially defined in 
the franchise agreement. Then, of course, it assumes risk of demand.  Operat
-ng  cost risks are hedged by indicing, demand risks by FD's guarantees in the 
Demand Operator 
Operating revenue Operator igreement, operating revenues risks -in case 	of eg accidents - and govern- 
ment policy changes are hedged by the formulation of agreement terms. Government policy Operator 
A forward contract is an arrangement where  eg 12 month rate is agreed as a base rate 
for debt. After 12 months the borrower pays the difference of the initial and present rate if the 
present rate is higher than it was initially; in an opposite case, the lender compensates the 
difference. 
2 	For example, Railtrack may agree to pay a dollar debt in pounds. The arrangements may 
also involve forward contract type of risk sharing against exchange rate fluctuations. 
U 	Discussion 
Rail industry structure in the UK is complex as the value chain links are cut vertically in 
to small, if not minimal, pieces. However, individual rail lines or links still remain a 
natural monopoly at least during the period of a franchise agreement. Very strong 
regulating and monitoring bodies are needed to ensure the functionality of the system 
and to guarantee that the welfare effects are achieved. A highly complex contractual 
system is needed to allocate various risks and responsibilities between the parties 
within the industry. 
As long as Railtrack is financing capital projects through access charges and is at the 
same time allowed to receive a full return in respect to the risk of the investment, there 
is an equilibrium in risk-return and demand-price trade-offs. Similarly, if Operator is in-
vesting equity in the project and expects to recover its investment from ticket fees or 
service payments received from customers (added with government support), the 
same economic principles apply. Theoretically taken, the British model should be 
functional in this respect, which explains largely the new industry structure. Govern-
ment, ie the Franchising Director, is interested in capital projects as it may be required 
to subsidy the investment, and this may cause some distortion to the otherwise  
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orthodox framework. On the other hand, the government may have a strong incentive 
to see the project realised, and thus it may have to accept both subsidies and high re-
turns to project investors. It would be certainly in the government's interest to  forrnu
-late the franchising agreement in these circumstances such that the payments from 
the Operator provide some return also to the government  / Franchising Director. The 
difference between the parties in the bargaining process, as project financing is ar-
ranged, is that other parties look for economic return in monetary terms, while the 
government / Franchising Director looks for social return. Both goals may be satisfied 
simultaneously. 
As for risks, it is observed that major risks are almost completely transferred to the pri-
vate sector, namely Railtrack and Train Operating Companies. 
3.2 	Sweden 
Li 	Organisation 1 
The re-structunng of the Swedish railway industry started in 1988 with Transport Pol-
icy Act adopted by the Parliament. Since then the re-structuring has been more or 
less a constant process. The industry consists of the following parties and 
organisations: 
Banverket (BV for short; National Rail Administration), that owns and 
manages the rail and the related infrastructure.  Banverket adopts the view 
of public benefit. It is also responsible for the development of infrastruc-
ture, ie investments. Banverket charges access fees, or rather infra-
structure use charges, from the train operating companies that are in 
passenger or freight traffic business.  
• 	Railway Inspectorate (RI), which is responsible for track allocation and 
traffic management. RI is an independent unit organised within By.  
• 	Statens Järnvägar, SJ (State Railways), a state-owned railway company 
that operates both passenger and freight traffic. Like any operator, SJ 
 pays infrastructure charges to  Banverket. The majority of the rolling stock
in Sweden is owned and managed by SJ. The stations are owned by SJ 
 as well.  SJ operates on a business basis, ie maximises profits. It has an
exclusive right to operate main rail lines.  
• 	Private operators, that have an access right, though only after SJ, to net- 
work in order to carry out their transport business. Operators can run their 
business only on regional lines. Anyone who conforms to the requirements 
specified by the state, is eligible to operate a rail line.  
• 	County Transport Authorities  (CTA), who have a right to exercise local 
passenger transport, which is usually purchased from  SJ or private oper-
ators. The infrastructure charge for those passenger lines is paid by the 
operator. CTA has received the rolling stock that was used previously by 
 SJ  to provide local/regional transport services on a non-profit basis.  
• 	Swedish Transport Board (STB), that purchases or subsidies non- 
profitable transport services to achieve regional policy objectives, and cov-
ers SJ profit account deficit if necessary. 
Sources: 1) Hansson L: A New Swedish Raiiroad Policy: Separation of Infrastructure and Traffic 
Production. Transportation Research, vol 25A, no 4, 1991, pp  153-159. 2) Government Bill 1995/96:92 
of the Swedish Government 3)  Larsson S & Ekström A: The Case of Swedish Railways. Privatisation of 
Railways. European Conference of Ministers of Transport, Paris 1993, pp  51-80. 
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• 	Engineering consultants , maintenance service suppliers, construc- 
tion contractors, who provide services for  Banverket. Banverket still in-
cludes some construction and maintenance units that carry out operations. 
The industry-wide organisation is shown in figure 3-2 and a corresponding value-
chain-link/line-of-business matrix presentation is shown in table 3-3.  ln appendix 2 an-
other description of the intra-industry relations is presented. 
Contract 
Infrastructure owner 	
- 	 aaei1 
Rail 
Banverket 	Inspectorate I ---------I 	
I I 	Public interest 	I 
Swedish 
Transport 	
I 
	
8CC 	charge 
Board 
Transport service 	
Track 
SUDS,a'es 	 SJ, Other 
Trans tservices Operators 
(po!fticaIobjed:s) 	
Passenger/Fre  
Freight charges 	Construction and 
Infrastructure servicei 
Ticket tees 	I 	Engineering, Transport 
Authorities 	 LocaI/Re,onaI (operating revenu 
Maintenance transport services 
I 	 I 	I 	Business 
Customers 	Juui tl•l$DO 
Consumers 	serves 
Figure 3-2. The Swedish Railway Industry. Note the roles of Transport Board and 
County Authorities as important transport service buyers. ln a way, they are cus-
tomers from the operators' point of view.  
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Table 3-3. The Swedish Railway  Industri. Value-chain/Line-of-business matrix 
Line-of-business 
Value Chain Link 
Intercity Passenger Commuter Wagonload Freight 
Operations Stations, Terminals SJ SJ Banverket 
Traffic Management Rail Inspectorate Rail lnspectorate Rail Inspectorate 
Train Crew SJ SJ, Private Operators  SJ, Private Operators 
Traction 	and Maintenance SJ SJ, CTA SJ, Private Operators 
Rolling Stock Ownership SJ SJ, CTA SJ, Private Operators 
Support Customer Account Control  SJ SJ, Private Operators  SJ, Private Operators 
Services Marketing, Pricing and Sales  SJ SJ, Private Operators  SJ, Private Operators 
New Service Development SJ SJ, Private Operators  SJ, Private Operators 
Infrastructure 
and Property 
Design and Engineering 
_________________________  
Banverket 
(assumes responsibility, 
but operations con- 
tracted out to private 
firms) 
Banverket 
(as previously) 
_____________________  
Banverket 
 (as previously) 
Maintenance  
_________________________  
Banverket 
(as previously) 
Banverket 
(as previously) 
Banverket 
(as previously) 
Construction  Banverket 
(as previously) 
Banverket 
(as previously) 
Banverket 
 (as previously) 
Ownership Banverket Banverket Banverket 
D 	Investment Financing 
Capital investments in the rail infrastructure are financed by the state budget. Ban-
verket is responsible for preparing and implementing capital budgets after parliament 
approval. However, private investments may also take place. As an example one can 
point out Arlandabanan, the fast train connection from the centre of Stockholm to  Ar-
landa airport. A single-project company owned by the state (A-Banan Projekt AB) was 
founded to manage the project in the interest of the state, while a private consortium 
(A-Train AB) was built to engineer, finance, build and operate the train connection. A 
concession contract was agreed upon between A-Train and A -Banan, giving the A- 
Train AB the right to operate the line until year 2040 after which A-Train AB transfers 
the project to A-Banan Projekt AB. ln this respect the project is a pure example of 
 BOT  concept with the exception of state being involved as an owner through a sepa-
rate project company. The Arlanda project organisation is shown in figure 3-3. The 
shareholders of A-Train are multinational mega-firms (GEC,  Mowlem), large power 
generating companies (Vattenfall) and construction contractors  (NCC, Siab). A-Train 
pays no infrastructure charges to Banverket, but SJ pays some track fees for track 
use to A-Train.  
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State 
A-Banan 
 Proekt  AB 
Concassion  
A-Train AB 
Shareholders: 
MoWem, GEC-Aisthom. 
 Vattenfall,  NCC, Slab 
Figure 3-3. Arlandabanan Project Organisation1 . Note the two-staged organisation 
where the state has isolated itself from any contractual obligations. The state bears 
the risks of an equity investor and, of course, the risks of public benefit losses in case 
of bad outcome of the project. 
U 	Risks 
Risks are usually allocated according to table 3-4. It can be noted that as long as the 
number of private operators is modest, most of the risks within the industry are borne 
ultimately by the state of Sweden (which owns  SJ) and therefore by the Swedish tax-
payer. ln the case of Arlandabanan major project risks are, as always in  BOT projects, 
borne by the equity investors and debt investors. More detailed contractual arrange-
ments dictate the risk allocation between the parties involved. 
Table 3-4. 
Typical Risk Allocation in Rail Infrastructure Capital Projects in Sweden 
(excluding special arrangements such as Arlandabanan) 
Risk Party Risk-Return Trade-offs and Hedging Options 
Investment cost Banverket (state) No risk-return trade-off analyses are done in public projects based on 
traditional benefit-cost-analyses. The state may use contractual clauses, 
 eg  fixed-priced contracts, to protect itself against cost overruns. 
Interest rate (cost of debt)  Banverket (state) Long-term reference rates may be used as debt interest rate. 
Foreign exchange rate  
(if 	foreign 	capital 	is 
employed) 
Banverket (state) 
__________________ 
Forward contracts, swaps. 
Operating cost  SJ, Private Operators Basically all risks during and related to operation of traffic are borne by 
operators. No protective contractual security exists. Demand SJ, Private Operators 
Operating revenue SJ, Private Operators 
Government policy SJ, Private Operators 
Source: Brochures of Arlandabanan (Banverket). 
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Li 	Discussion 
The Swedish model differs from the British one in the sense that privatisation has not 
been taken to the extreme, ln fact, state still owns SJ that holds exclusive rights in re-
gard to traffic operating. Thus, it can be said that even in traffic operations true com-
petition is lacking. On the other hand, the first elements of free competition have now 
been created, and it is expected that the industry is re-structured in time due to market 
forces and growing liberalisation on the behalf of the state. 
Project financing and concessions can be used in special cases where the project 
(and its prospects in terms of cash flow generation) in itself is profitable enough to in-
vite private investors. 
3.3 	Norway 
U 	Organisation 
ln Norway, the state company NSB is practically the 
 sesses  monopoly rights concerning both infrastructure
 dustry  consists simply of NSB, the customers using its 
suppliers offering their services to NSB. 
same as the industry. It pos
-and traffic production. The in-
services and contractors and 
U 	Financing of Investments 
A special case in Norway is Gardemobanen 1 , a Norwegian version of Arlandabanan. 
Gardemobanen extends from the centre of Oslo to Oslo airport (Gardemoen). A 
single-project company was formed by the state via  NSB. NSB is the sole shareholder 
of NSB Gardemobanen A/S. The company is responsible for the building and opera-
tion of the line. It buys its own equipment. If other operators wish to use the line, they 
pay a track charge to Gardemobanen project company. The state of Norway is both 
the equity and debt financier of the company. 
U 	Investment Risks 
Since all typical capital projects are financed by the state budget, the State of Norway 
 / NSB  bears the risks. Even in special project arrangements, like  Gardemobanen 
 where state is involved as a major shareholder of the project company, the ultimate 
risks are borne by the state. 
U 	Discussion 
It is easy to conclude that Norway's model represents the traditional rail industry ar-
rangements even if some special forms of project financing are experimented with. 
From project financing point of view, extending the project equity holders to private 
sector should have some effect on incentive to implement and operate the project 
more efficiently. For example, road investment financing with tolls in Norway usually 
involves also other promoters besides state authorities2 . 
Sources: Brochures received from Norwegian State Railways  (NSB). 
2 	Leviakangas P: Bomvägfinansiering i Norge (Road Toll Financing in Norway). Vägverkets interna 
publikationer 37/1 996. 
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3.4 	Finland 
0 	Organisation 1 
ln Finland, the railway industry structure resembles that of Sweden. Infrastructure and 
operations are separated and licensed operators have access to tracks. Parties within 
the industry can be listed as follows: 
The Finnish Rail Administration (RHK)  owns the infrastructure and is re-
sponsible for its development and acts as a public authority. It receives ac-
cess or infrastructure charges from operators. It also finances its 
operations by receiving funds from the state budget.  
• 	yR, the former. State Railways, that has recently been turned into a profit 
seeking business unit, is a limited company, but is maintained completely 
in state ownership through its shares. VR in tum is divided into separate 
independent companies according to their lines of business. The mother 
company takes care of the administrative and financial operations. VR Ltd 
owns the majority of the rolling stock, both passenger and freight, in Fin-
land. VR owns the major stations and terminals through separate property 
companies. A more detailed company structure is shown in figure 3-4. 
U 	According to the 1995 railways act other EU-originated operators may 
enter the tracks to exercise their passenger or freight traffic business if a 
license is granted by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Only 
international passenger and freight traffic is open to competition (no li-
cence applications have been received so far, that is September -96). VR 
 holds exclusive rights to domestic traffic, but only until year 1999.  
VR - Holdings Ltd  
Mministrative and financial 
services to subsidiaries 
	
100% 	 I 100% 
VRLtd 	II 	VR -Track Ltd 
Passanger and freight 	ngineering & constructic 
transoort services I  & nintenance services 
I 60% 
VR - Data 
Information technology 
services 
86% 
Property 
Holdings 
Property managemant 
98% 	 60% 
Pohjolan 	
Avecra Ltd Uikenne Ltd 	I 
Road & combined 	 catering services 
passenger & freight in trains and stations 
Figure 3-4. VR Company Structure in 1996. Note that practically all operations are ar-
ranged under the holding company which makes the company a vety integrated busi-
ness in both vertical and horizontal directions. 
1 	Sources: 1) The Finnish Rail Administration: Annual Report 1995. 2)  VR Annual Report 1994. 
3)1995 Railways Act of the Parliament. 4) Discussions with  RHK and VR executives. 
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frastructure owner 
Public interest  
Finnh Rail 
Administration 	Contract 
(RHK) 
yment access 
Transport services 	Infrastructure services 
VR - Tracl 
VR Ltd 	 Engineering! 
Passanger/Freight 	Construdion/ 
(State owfled) Maintenance 
(State owned) 
Transport 	1Tickat fees 
sensces I Freight charges 
Customers 
Consumers 
Figure 3-5. The Finnish Rail Industry. This is a simplified version. A more detailed de-
scnption can be found in chapter 5. 
Financing of Investments 
RHK is solely responsible for capital budgeting of the rail infrastructure. It receives the 
necessary funds from the state budget (or perhaps to put it more accurately: the funds 
the parliament sees appropriate). Infrastructure charges paid to  RHK by the operators 
are taken into account as RHK receives budget funds (net budgeting). 
Some recent proposals have been made to finance investments with private capital. 
However, applicable policies or practices do not exist so far.  Eg who are the appropri-
ate promoters for a particular project is unclear since the Finnish framework is rela-
tively new and both experience and analyses lacking. 
Risks in Capital Projects 
As long as investments are financed by the state budget the risks are borne by Finn-
ish taxpayers. 
Discussion 
The Finnish case is discussed in more depth in chapter 5  
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4 	SOME BASIC MODELS - A SYNTHESIS 
4.1 	Synthesis 
On the basis of previous examples it is possible to formulate a synthesis. The value 
chain / line-of-business matrix and presentation are adopted in order to make the syn-
thesis clear, comprehensible and comparable. Four types of organisational basic 
models are synthesised: 
Extreme. vertical .disintegration, where value chain links are 
separated to as many units as possible. This is the British 
model. The track allocation and traffic management activities 
are assumed to remain the responsibility of the state authority. 
2 	Separating infrastructure and traffic operations and allow- 
ing free competing in operations. This is a slightly more lib-
eral model than the Swedish solution. However, in Sweden this 
type of an arrangement is partially used on local and regional 
lines. 
3 	Separating infrastructure and traffic operations while main- 
taining both in state ownership. This perhaps resembles 
most the Finnish model. However, in infrastructure construction 
operations there is practically free competition in Finland (un-
like in Sweden where a larger portion of construction and reha-
bilitation work is done by Banverket itself). 
4 	Public railways, where the state owns and manages both the 
infrastructure and traffic as in Norway. 
Other possibilities for simplified modelling exist, of course, but since they are not ap-
plied in the countries examined in this paper, they have been omitted. These other 
alternatives are 
horizontal disintegration, ie unbundling the lines of business; there are no 
theoretical obstacles for this 
regional disintegration which in turn leads to regional monopolies  
pnvatising the railways as a single unit, ie creating a privately or part- 
privately owned national monopoly. 
The intra-industry organisation has a most restricting affect on the financial and con-
tractual arrangements available.  
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4.2 	Business Areas 
Tables 4-la to 4-Id show the basic models in their value chain / line-of-business 
framework. The shaded cells refer to private participation or ownership. 
Tables 4-la and 4-lb. 
Train Crew 
Traction 	and Maintenance 
Rolling Stock Ownership - __________________ 
Support Customer Account Control 
Services Marketing,_Pricing and Sales : 
--- 
______________________  
New Service Development 
Infrastructure Design and Engineering  
and Property Maintenance 
-- 
_____ 
Construction  --________ 
Ownership  ____________ 
,,,,-.-.---- 
MODEL 2: SEPARATING INFRASTRUCTURE AND MAINTENANCE, FREE COMPETITION IN OPERATIONS 
Line-of-business I Intercity Passenger Commuter Freight 
Value Chain Link 
Operations Stations, Terminals 
Traffic Management 
Train Crew 
Traction 	and Maintenance 
Rolling Stock Ownership 
Support Customer Account Control 
Services Marketing, Pricing and Sales -- 	-- - ____________________ 
New Service Development 
Infrastructure Design and Engineering 
and Property Maintenance  
,.-- 
Construction 
Ownership 	 - - 	- 
Tables 4-Ic and 4-Id. 
MODEL 3: SEPARATING INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS, PUBLIC  ENTERPRISE/STATE 
 MONOPOLY 
Line-of-business 	llntercity Passenger I 	Commuter 	I 	Freight 
Value Chain Link 
Operations Stations, Terminals 
Traffic Management 
Train Crew 
Traction 	and Maintenance 
Rolling Stock Ownership _________________ __________________ _________________  
Support Customer Account Control 
Services Marketing, Pricing and Sales 
New Service Development - ____________ _________ 
Infrastructure Design and Engineering 
and Property Maintenance 
Construction  
_______________  Ownership __________________ __________________ __________________  
MODEL 4: PUBLIC RAILWAYS 
Line-of-business 
Value Chain Link 
Intercity Passenger Commuter Freight 
Operations Stations, Terminals 
Traffic Management 
Train Crew 
Traction 	and Maintenance 
Rolling Stock Ownership  ________________ _________________ ________________ 
Support 
Services 
Customer Account Control 
Marketing, Pricing and Sales 
New Service Development 
Infrastructure Design and Engineering 
and Property Maintenance 
Construction  
_______________  Ownership __________________ 
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25 4.3 	Contractual and Financial Relations 
A similar illustration of contractual and financial relations as was presented in appen-
dices 1-3 is shown in the next four tables (see next pages). It can be observed how 
quickly the industry structure becomes more complicated and thus requires more de-
tailed legislation concerning licence regulation and competition rules, for example. 
Also technical requirements are emphasised as far as traffic management and control 
and other traffic safety systems and activities are concerned. 
MODEL 1: EXTREME VERTICAL DISINTEGRATION 
TO: Rail Authority Private Infra- Private Infra- Private Traf- Private Roll- Customers, 
structure structure fic Operator ing Stock Consumers 
Manager Services passenger Manager 
FROM: /freight ____________ ____________  
Rail Authority Licence to Licence to op- 
manage erate passen- 
infrastructure; ger and freight 
State control traffic; 
Franchises rail 
lines 
Private Infrastruc- Licence fee Contract pay- Infrastructure 
ture Manager ments for provision; 
seivices Track 
allocation 
Private Infrastruc- Service 	pro vi- 
ture Services 
ing, 
construction, 
_______________  maintenance) 
Private Traffic Licence fee; Access Lease pay- Transport 
Operator Franchising charges; men ts for services 
passenger/freight  charges 
sion (engineer- 
Infrastructure equipment; 
charges Payments for 
maintenance 
services 
Private Rolling Equipment 
Stock Manager ___________ ____________ ____________  leasing ____________ ____________ 
Customers, Ticket fees; 
Consumers Freight 
charges (sales  
________________ ____________  revenues) 
MODEL 	2: 	SEPARATING 	INFRASTRUCTURE 	AND 	OPERATIONS, 	FREE 	COMPETITION 	IN 
OPERATIONS 
TO: Rail Authority; Private Traffic Private Rolling Customers, 
Infrastructure Operator Stock Manager Consumers 
FROM: Manager passengerlfreight _______________ _______________ 
Rail Authority; Track access; 
Infrastructure Manager Infrastructure 
provision; 
______________________ ________________  (Subsidies)  ________________ ________________  
Private Traffic Operator Access fees; Lease payments Transport services  
passenger/freight Infrastructure 
charges 
Private Rolling Stock Equipment 
Manager provision; 
Maintenance 
services 
Customers, Consumers Ticket fees; 
Freight charges 
(sales revenues) 
MODEL 	3: 	SEPARATING 	INFRASTRUCTURE 	AND 	OPERATIONS, 	PUBLIC 	ENTERPRISE/STATE 
MONOPOLY 
TO: Rail Authority; Public Traffic Operator Customers, Consumers 
Infrastructure Manager passenger/freight 
FROM: 
Rail Authority; Track access; 
Infrästructu re Manager Infrastructure provision; 
______________________ _______________________  (Subsidies)  _______________________  
Private Traffic Operator Access fees; Transport services  
passenger/freight Infrastructure charges 
Customers, Consumers Ticket fees; Freight charges  
(sa/es revenues) 
MODEL 4: PUBLIC RAILWAYS 
TO: Rail Authority; Customers, Consumers 
Infrastructure Owner 
FROM: 
Rail Authority ____________________________  Transport services 
Customers, Consumers Ticket fees; Freight charges  
(sa/es revenues) 
These models may also be presented as in figure 4-2. The presentation is oversimpli -
fied and is modified from previous models by simply converting the vertical value - 
chains to horizontal direction.  
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MODEL I 
Licencing, Franchising 
Track allocation 
Rail 	I 	I Infrastructure I 	I 	Traffic 
Authority Manager 	I 	Operators 
Rolling 
Stock 
Manager 
Lease payments 
MODEL 2 & 3 
Infrastructure 
Traffic Operator 
Rail Authority 	 (Rolling stock owner) 
(Infrastructure owner) 
	
(Private or public enterprise) 
MODEL 4 
Public Railways 
Private 
 fimi  
activity 
Figure 4-2. Oversimplified Organisational Models and Their Contractual and Financial 
Relations. Note the relevance of vertical integration or  dis-integration. 
Another figure (4-3) attempts to set the country examples in the model framework. 
The vertical axis of the figure describes the intensity of competition in different opera-
tions within the industry. The horizontal axis is the state ownership of the industry. As 
it can be seen from the figure, the UK and Norway represent the extreme cases of rail 
industries, while Finland and Sweden are in the "midway" of industry re-structuring. 
Naturally, the figure is highly conceptual and is only meant to be an illustration of dif-
ferences between the countries. 
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Fr.. competition Comp.tmon 	 Public ent.rpn.es 
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Private 
monopolies Public railw.ys 
Figure 4-3. A Comparative Illustration of Rail Industries in the Example Countries. 
Note the keener competition (or rather, possibilities of keener competition) in traffic 
operations of Sweden compared to that of Finland. However, in Finland the competi-
tion in construction and rehabilitation works is keener than in Sweden. 
4.4 	Investment Financing Considerations 
As for capital investments in rail infrastructure, the key question is who owns and 
"sells" (ie provides track for use) the infrastructure. When this question is reflected 
against the synthesised basic models some potential alternatives emerge in the ar-
ranging of finance. The following discussion deals with each model separately. 
U 	Model 1: Extreme Vertical Disintegration 
Assuming that rail infrastructure is privately owned and managed as it is in the UK, the 
infrastructure owner evaluates the investment strictly in economic terms. Hence, the 
owner of the tracks evaluates the demand from the side of potential operators; these 
in tum evaluate the demand of potential customers thus making projections of future 
cash flows. If public interest is to be included in project evaluation, then the rail 
authority has to participate in the investment with a financial input. This means in 
practice one of the following alternatives (or a combination of them): 
subsidy arrangement for the infrastructure owner 
direct equity or debt infusion on behalf of the government 
loan guarantees provided by the government  
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indirect support, eg by subsidising train operating companies on the new 
line, who in tum pay access or infrastructure charges to the owner of the 
tracks. 
If the track owner succeeds in participating with the operator as an equity partner, this 
will put both parties in the same boat and risks are divided into smaller portions. The 
stronger the equity investors' involvement and the greater their number, the easier it 
will be to raise debt capital from capital market. All possibilities of free capital markets 
and their instruments of financing are available for project investors. 
Model 2: Separating Infrastructure and Operations, 
Free Competition in Operations  
ln  this model, the infrastructure owner, assumed to be state authority, will be able to 
finance a capital project by receiving access or infrastructure charges from operators  - 
provided that the project is economically viable and profitable. Any other cases de-
mand for state input. The following arrangements may be considered: 
founding a separate private (or partly private) project company to finance, 
build and operate the project; a concession period may be granted to the 
project company that is sufficiently long to amortise loans and provide re-
turn on equity; the required cash flow is received from either access 
charges or directly from consumers and customers or from a combination 
of both sources 
the previous arrangement supplemented with state guaranteed loans or 
direct subsidies especially in projects with political goals but which include 
uncertainty concerning profitability 
financing the investment by the state budget (with the possibility of raising 
a part of the capital from other authorities,  eg local government). 
The first two alternatives are the typical off-balance sheet financing methods state 
authorities use, eg in BOT-projects. 
U 	Model 3: Separating Infrastructure and Operations, 
State Ownership or Major Holdings of Operations 
This model offers only one alternative of financing a project with private capital and 
keeping the state's "balance sheet" clean from additional debt: 
a state-granted concession right for a particular project company, with the 
project company assuming major financial risks of the project. Any other 
arrangement will evidently transfer the risks back to the state and the 
taxpayer.  
ln Norway, the Gardemobanen  is financed by a state-owned project company. Fur-
thermore, the state is the debt investor of the project thus bearing practically all pro-
ject risks. 
U 	Model 4: Public Railways  
ln  principal, various project financing alternatives exist also in this model. However, it 
is easy to foresee that there might be numerous potential conflicts of interest, if  eg a 
 BOT-concept would be employed. The initial starting points alone  - profit maximising 
project company and public interest guarding rail authority - can easily lead to 
conflicts.  
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D 	Summary 
The previous discussion is summarised in table 4-2.  
Thble 4-2 Summary of Investment Financina Alternatives 
Model Standard Arrangement for Capital Invest- Optional Arrangements 
ment Financing 
Extreme Vertical Disintegration Project promoters: Infrastructure owner with State involvement as an investor if the 
potential allies project has some public benefit poten- 
Capital source: Private capital market for debt tial but is not viable in pure economic 
and equity-equity from financial-assets terms 
Investment recovery: Access charges (and op- 
erating revenues if operating companies are 
investors) 
Separation of Infrastructure and Proiect promoters: Infrastructure owner, ie the Project financing with concession con- 
Operations; Free Competition in state tracts; promoters can therefore include 
Operations Capital source: State budget several parties from private sector as 
Investment recovery: Access charges, licence well as from public sector; the invest- 
fees ment is recovered either from access 
charges or operating revenues or from 
a combination of both 
Separation of Infrastructure and Project promoters: State Project financing as above 
Operations; State Ownership Capital source: State budget 
Investment recovery: 	Operating 	revenues / 
state taxes 
Public Railways Project promoters: State Project financing as above 
Capital source: State budget 
Investment 	recovery: 	Operating 	revenues / 
state taxes 
Finally, it should be noted that there is really only one prerequisite for the unbundling 
and pnvatising of the activities of railway industry: the markets have to be efficient. To 
be efficient, the market has to fulfil three conditions: 
1 there has to be several competitors within the market 
2 the competition has to be fair, ie state intervention has to be restricted 
to the minimum 1 
3 the market has to be sufficiently large in order to fulfil the first 
condition. 
1 	Regulations are needed, of course. 
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5 	FINANCING OF CAPITAL PROJECTS IN FINLAND 
5.1 	Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss in more depth the project-specific financing alter-
natives that are available in the Finnish circumstances. It should emphasised that all 
presentations from hereafter take the project-specific view, and therefore differ from 
the industry-wide outlooks of previous chapters. Some alternative arrangements are 
presented on the basis of previous analysis, and their strengths and weaknesses are 
evaluated. Refemng to VR. means the VRgroup of companies as a whole. If it is of 
relevance, the particular subsidiary is referred to, for instance  VR Ltd or VR-Track 
(see figure 3-4 where the company structure of VR is shown). 
The Finnish framework is rather simple with VR holding a monopoly position in rail 
transport and RHK being the owner of the infrastructure 1 . The main principle is that 
 RHK  receives budget funds for capital outlays which it realises by submitting contracts
to VR (or more precisely, to VR-Track Ltd as the main contractor, which is a subsidiary 
of yR-Holdings Ltd). RHK may also tender out the works directly to private contractors 
and VR is participating in the competition like the others. VR in turn tenders out a part 
of the works to private contractors. Evidently, in some cases VR is in a position of a 
construction manager. 
The procedure of investment activities is approximately as follows:  
- 	RHK is the initial planner and programmer of investments 
- 	RHK makes suggestions about investment needs to the Ministry of Trans- 
port and Communications, which submits the proposals to the State 
Treasurer 
- 	the State Treasurer prepares annual state budgets and the Parliament 
gives the final approval  
- 	RHK assigns the construction and other works directly to  VR-Track for 
agreed cost or tenders out the works through open competition  
- 	VR-Track tenders out part of the works subscribed by  RHK. 
Three main alternatives for project realisation can be identified in the Finnish context: 
Direct state budget funding 
2 	Project financing with VR acting as the initial project promoter 
and equity investor 
3 	Project financing through a separate single-project company; 
equity investors may include several parties in addition to VR 
 (in fact,  VR does not necessarily have to be involved). 
The last two alternatives clearly include numerous variants. For example, the second 
main alternative may involve public-private partnership arrangements or the project 
company arrangement may involve public equity investors including the state. Some 
variants are picked for closer examination as the analysis proceeds or they are pre-
sented as ideas for further examination. 
Including land property under the tracks.  
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5.2 	State-of-the-art: State Budget Funding 
The state budget funding model is shown in figure 5-1. It should be emphasised that 
the customers include eg a joint capital region transport organisation  (YTV) consisted 
of four cities 1 . YTV is one of the customers of VR Ltd that purchases services for its 
citizens. To be more exact, YTV purchases a certain amount of seat kilometres re-
gardless of how many passengers actually use the train. Approximately one tenth of 
the revenues received by VR Ltd from domestic passenger traffic comes from YTV. 
 The passengers still pay a ticket price but it is received by  YTV. 
State of Finland 
Subsidies 
Ministry of Transport  
arga 	Finnish Rail 
Customers 	I 
(including YTV)  I & Consumers 
I 
New 
assets 
Sales 	VR Ud 
revenues 	i 
Contract 	
Project 
Contractors & 
payments Suppliers I  (yR-Track included) 
Figure 5-1. State-of-the-art Model: State Budget Funding of Capital Project. The sub-
sidies received from the Ministry of Transport may be purchases of transport se,vices 
on socio-economic grounds. 
The risks are allocated according to table 5-1. The strength of this model lies in its 
simplicity since no new arrangements are required neither from  VR nor RHK or any 
other authorities. The weakness is obvious: state budget is subject to strict 
constraints. 
Table 5-1. Risks in Budget Funded Project 
Risk Party Notes 
Investment cost RHK 
or 
Contractor 
RHK bears the investment cost risk unless it employs 
a fixed price contract, thus transferring the risk to the 
contractor. 
Interest rate (cost of debt)  RHK Evidently, the state bears the risk. 
Operating cost (traffic operations) VR VR has few options for covering these risks. 	Ulti- 
mately, the state of Finland and the Finnish taxpayer 
bear the risks if losses of VR are covered by 
subsidies. 
Demand VR 
Operating revenue  VR 
Government policy VR 
ln fact, the existence of YTV is defined by law, which forces the four cities to organise their trans-
port services on a common basis for the benefit of their citizens.  
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5.3 	Project Financed Directly by VR 
This model may be illustrated according to figure 5-2. VR acts as a pnmary investor 
and raises debt capital from capital market. Thus the project is totally financed intern-
ally. ln this manner, VR purchases a new "market" for itself as long as it has exclusive 
rights1 to operate the new line. ln principle, VR should cover the debt service require-
ments and operation costs by cash inflows from operations. ln theory,  VR may also 
provide track capacity for other operators and thus finance part of the investment by 
access and infrastructure charges. 
Transport seivks 
Other 
Sales 
Operators 
Customers 
 &  Consumers 
(including YV) 
State of Finland 
Operator licence 
Ministry of Transport 
Finnish Rail 
Administration 
Track 
aess 
 charge  
VR 
Sales 
	 sibly allied with  
mvenues YTV or other 
	
New marker, asset 
operators) 
Debt 
Investors 
,ueDr 	I 	I I 	Project se,vice Contractors & 
Debt 	I Suppliers 
capital I (including yR-Track) 
Figure 5-2. VR as an Internal Financier. Note that any debt raised is the liability of  VR 
 as a whole. The dotted lines represent optional arrangements. 
The risks and their allocations may be listed as shown in table 5-2. The strength of 
this particular model is that the state assumes no direct risk. The weaknesses are that 
the investments are financed by cash flows received from all passengers 
and freight customers - not just from those who use the particular services 
provided by the project, which would lead to decreased demand because 
of higher prices; it is unlikely, in many cases, that cash flows from pro-
ject's operations could reach a level at which debt service payments 
could be covered in addition to operating costs 
a direct consequence of the first weakness is that if price increases are out 
of the question, there has to be re-adjusting of access charges or subsi-
dies by the state (the usual practices and prices have to be re-evaluated); 
 VR  has to be compensated for the risks it assumes and for the additional
debt service payments. 
Note the 1999 limit. After that the domestic traffic operations should be totally free for competi-
tion. This rule needs to be altered in this particular project.  
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Table 5-2. 
Risk Party Notes 
Investment cost VR 
 or 
Contractor 
The risk may be transferred or divided ac- 
cording to the type of contract. 
Interest rate (cost of debt)  VR As VR is a state-owned, large company it is 
not likely that debt investors face any serious 
risk of not receiving the promised debt ser- 
vice. Ultimately, of course, the state bears the 
risks of unsuccessful projects and operations. 
Operating cost (traffic operations)  VR 
Demand 
______________________________ 
VR 
Operating revenue  
_______________ 
VR 
Government policy  VR 
D 	Variant 1: Other Investors Allied with  VR 
One possibility is that other investors take part. These could include  eg cities or mu-
nicipalities that directly benefit from the investment. If these autohonties manage to 
avoid expensive road and street investments because of new rails, the savings could 
be invested together with yR. Public organisations should also consider public, non- 
monetary, benefits. Similarly, the other traffic operators could be persuaded to infuse 
capital in return for the right to operate the tracks together with VR Ltd. Stronger and 
wider commitment from investors is likely to convince debt investors as well. However, 
there are some doubts whether even stronger investor consortiums could make the 
project economically viable in pure monetary terms.  
ln this variant, the risks have to be divided between the equity partners according to a 
special agreement, ie the liabilities of the partners have to be specified beforehand. 
This is necessary especially if revenues do not provide sufficient cash flow to cover 
operating and debt service costs. It is reasonable to assume that  VR Ltd and other 
operators face direct cash flow risk, while prospective public investors face mainly the 
risk of consumer surplus loss, ie loss of non-monetary benefits. 
Variant 2: Financing Only Construction Works, Traffic Operating 
Principles Remain Unchanged (Shadow Toll Principle)  
ln this variant, VR or any other equity investor finances the construction works only 
and receives payments from the state, not from the users of transport services. The 
principle is the same as with shadow toll roads 1 . The shadow price paid may be a pas-
senger volume -based or quality of works -based price or a combination of both. For 
example 
the "concessionaire" (financier, builder and owner of the tracks) receives 
payments from the state (RHK) annually x FIM/annum/passengerkm 
the "concessionaire" receives payments according to specified variables 
that are measured in frequent intervals; these variables describe the qual-
ity of construction works and the quality of maintenance works. 
Since there is no involvement of the "concessionaire" in traffic operations, the passen- 
ger volume -based payments do not seem reasonable. The only way the "concession- 
aire" is involved in traffic operations is through the ownership of rails. ln other words, 
1 	Shadow toll is a traffic volume -based unit price payment that the concessionaire receives from 
the state. The concessionaire is granted a licence to maintain the road for a long period of time (eg 
 15-30 years). The main idea of this  BOT-arrangement is that the concessionaire faces no demand risk 
that is directly related to prices of the services as is the case with conventional tolls.  Järvenpää-Lahti 
stretch on main road no 4 will be the first shadow toll road in Finland. It is currently under tendering 
process. 
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the concessionaire" permits access to its rails for a price that the traffic operators 
have to pay. However, because  VR holds the monopoly position in rail traffic, there is 
little room for bargaining for the "concessionaire", and one can question the meaning-
fulness of the arrangement. As for quality of works -based and quality of maintenance 
-based incentives, which seem applicable, one can clearly observe that this arrange-
ment is merely a special type of construction and maintenance contract. A similar sys-
tem has been experimented in Sweden in road projects:  "funktionsentreprenaci" 1 . ln 
 this particular contract type the contractor assumes responsibility for the quality of the 
road for approximately 20 years. On the whole, this variant resembles an advanced 
partial payment arrangement. To determine fair bonuses or sanctions based on the 
quality of works, a thorough and reliable measurement system needs to be 
established. 
The concessionaire faces investment cost risk, interest rate risk, and maintenance 
cost risk. Depending on the form of concession agreement, the concessionaire faces 
also some demand risk from the operator side and perhaps from the consumer side. 
For the state, this alternative is practically risk free in pure monetary terms. 
5.4 	Project Company Arrangements 
A hypothetical single-project company and the arrangements surrounding it are shown 
in figure 5-3. The model is in fact a pure example of the  BOT -concept. The project 
company receives a licence to operate the line from the Ministry of Transport. Its eq-
uity investors are likely to be VR and project contractors and perhaps other firms in 
transport business. The project company raises the necessary debt capital from cap-
ital market, while VR and possibly other promoters, perhaps even the state, act as 
guarantors. VR is likely, though not sure, to provide necessary rolling stock for the 
project company through leasing contract. A concession contract is made between the 
Ministry and the project company defining the concession period and the terms of 
transfer. At the end of the period the company is liquidated, the tracks and the operat-
ing rights are transferred back to the state. The state in turn considers whether to sell 
or to franchise the tracks and operating rights to appropriate parties2 . The detailed 
concession contract may include many options - eg state step-in-rights, debt investor 
step-in-rights, rewards or bonuses at the transfer stage, extending concession period 
options, etc. 
If any other operators, including  VR Ltd itself, wished to use the tracks, they could pay 
their share of infrastructure charges to RHK, thus reducing the payments of the pro-
ject company. This would increase the incentive to utilise the tracks more efficiently. 
I 	Funktionsentreprenad (Swedish) = Toimintavastuurakentaminen, NR (Finnish). The exact Eng- 
lish term does not exist for this form of contract. 
2 	Today, it is not known if more operators have entered the market and what is the destiny of infra- 
structure ownership. 
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State of Finland 
Option I 
Subsioy eg x% of sa les re venues orx FlMJpssenger 	____-. 
 Ministry of Transport 
Finnish Rail 
VR 	 Administration 
Customers 
& Consumers 	 Leasei 	Track 
(including YrV) payrn. I 
	
lease 	 Operating 
hence 
Transport 	I 
services ._I 	Guarantee 
I Sales mvennec 	p 	Project 
Company 	 pjI1 
Access ch 	 Debt 
Track provision __________________ 	service 
Other 
Operators 	 Contract 	, Equ 	DWkiends, 
I asset 	 Capital gains 	Debt 	 - 
-i 	 Investors 
Project 	 Equity 
Contractors & Investors 	_____ 
- 	 (eg yR Direct  euk  investment e' x% of Suppliers Contractors & Suppliers. 
total equity 
Figure 5-3. Single-Project Company Model. The dotted lines represent optional  ar- 
ran gements. The subsidy from the Ministry of Transport may also be a purchase of 
transport sei'vices on socio-economic grounds. 
The risks may be allocated according to table 5-3. The first implication is that most 
risks are transferred to the project company, which is exactly the purpose of BOT- 
financing. Debt investors ultimately face the risk of financial difficulties leading to ex-
ceptional arrangements or in the worst case project bankruptcy. Bankruptcy will result 
in the lenders taking over the project and operating it or selling it further. On the other 
side, equity investors bear the ultimate risk of losing their equity input totally. ln a less 
severe case, they do not receive the expected return on their investment in the form 
of dividends or capital gains (if the shares are tradable). 
Table 5-3. 
Risk Party Notes 
Investment cost Project company The risk may be transferred or divided according to the type of contract. Usually 
or BOT projects employ fixed-priced contracts with incentives to speed up construction 
Contractor works. The motive for this is clear: a) as the project is likely to be a large one includ- 
ing numerous risk factors, the project company has an incentive to transfer as much 
investment cost risk to the contractor as possible b) the sooner the project is opera- 
tional the sooner will the cash inflows occur. 
Interest rate Project company The project company is able to "smooth" the interest rate risk with various instru- 
(cost of debt)  ments (forward contracts, long-term rates, etc.). 
Operating 	cost Project company The risk may be partially covered with various index clauses included in the conces- 
(traffic operations) sion contract. One possibility is indexing the amount of subsidies (if subsidies are 
agreed upon) and the other is the freedom in service pricing. 
Demand Project company Demand risk is difficult to cover unless the concession agreement states some prin- 
ciples of covering the losses of low demand. 
Operating revenue Project company From the project company point of view, this risk is a result of demand risk. 
Government policy Project company Concession agreement may hold some protective elements, if eg wage or materials 
costs rise due to government actions. 
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The strengths of the model are the following: 
practically all project nsks are borne by the project company 
- 	since the project company is subject to general accounting rules, a trans- 
parency of its operations is achieved  
- 	the state has an opportunity to realise a project by off-balance-sheet fin- 
ance and therefore perhaps earlier than otherwise would have been 
possible 
- 	VR acts as a useful tool from the state's point of view in project financing 
operations; at the same time,  VR can extend its business concepts to pro-
ject financing activities 
if there are several equity investors with considerable input, there is a 
commitment to build and operate the project economically and efficiently; 
 eg  an involvement of project contractors results in an incentive to build the
project fast (in order to produce early cash inflow) but well (in order to 
avoid extra repair and maintenance costs); the involvement of VR will re-
sult in a strong back up from the monopoly holder thus preventing misuse 
of its position. 
On the negative side it is possible to list: 
complexity as the arrangement involves several parties with agreement 
and contract combinations that are difficult to manage; the more risk hedg-
ing is practised the more complicated will the whole structure be 
the concept is new in Finland; therefore the first applications will lead to 
many both practical and philosophical questions; there is also a lack of ex-
pertise and knowledge in this area in Finland 
since the projects tend to be large including large sunk costs as well and 
the period of investment recovery is probably between 10-30 years, the 
projects are highly risky; therefore:  
*  debt investors may feel that the investment is too risky and 
put extra premiums in the interest rate; this may result in high 
cost of capital for the project company  
*  debt investors may not take part in the project unless exten-
sive guarantees are made; the guarantors must be reliable 
enough 
the potential (domestic) project investors are few in a small country 
the arrangement also requires political support (see below) 
finally, the 1995 legal act concerning railways states that an operator li-
cence may be granted only to operators in international rail traffic; thus, 
the domestic monopoly position of VR Ltd is protected by law until year 
1999; this legislation needs re-formulation or re-interpretation for the BOT- 
concept to be applicable before year 1999. 
From the VR point of view, it is notable that if several projects are financed separately 
with similar arrangements, this will change the whole company structure of yR. 
 Whether this is positive or negative development is worth further consideration, but 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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D 	Variant 1: State Subsidies or Purchases of Services 
(see figure 5-3, options I and 2) 
The project company will improve its position (and the project itself the possibilities of 
realisation) if the state is willing to contribute as well. The amount of input, or subsidy, 
should approximately equal the marginal socio-economic benefits that are not paid 
directly by the passengers. The form of subsidy could be either an equity input (option 
2 in figure 5-3) or an aid paid to the project company as portion of sales revenues or 
passenger volumes (option I). The latter alternative may also be a state purchase 
-principle employed in order to achieve political socio-economic goals as described 
previously. 
The risks should remain essentially the same provided that the portion of subsidy is 
not very large. 
U 	Variant 2: Track Provision to Other Operators 
As was previously pointed out when VR was considered as a direct capital investor, it 
is possible for the project company to provide tracks for other traffic operators and re-
ceive access charges and thus improve its financial position. Furthermore, from the 
socio-economic point of view, a more efficient utilisation of track capacity is most pre-
ferable. This variant is in a way two-phased competition: at the first phase, the state 
selects the project company, concessionaire, on the basis of competition; the second 
phase is that the concessionaire tenders out the operating contracts to the extent it 
sees appropriate and is allowed to by the rail authorities. 
The risk of demand of traffic operators is borne by the concessionaire. If some forms 
of state subsidies are included in the contract, this revenue stream may also be risky if 
it is too depended on passenger demand. 
Li 	Other Variants and Other Possibilities 
Numerous other fine-tuned alternatives are available. For instance, one may list the 
following variants / possibilities: 
- 	combinations of variants I and 2  
- 	stronger commitment from cities and counties as guarantors, equity inves- 
tors and customers 
- 	capital raising from the public by issuing tradable shares and bonds  
- 	private bond (or share) issues to investors who seek long-term and stable 
cash flows, eg pension funds and insurance companies.  
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5.5 	Summary 
There are two ways to involve private capital in rail projects: 
1)VR and/or other investors make a direct capital investment and take the 
project risk as a whole; the debt capital used is shown in the investors' bal-
ance sheet; 
2) A separate project company is founded to finance, build and operate 
the rail link; practically all project risks are transferred to the project com-
pany; the debt is written in project company's balance sheet. 
Numerous variants are available in both cases. The main principle is that the private 
financier has to.assume.truebusiness.and.performance related risks,  eg traffic de-
mand risk and/or investment cost risk. 
The previous analyses may be further summarised as follows: 
- 	VR's  monopoly position is one of the key factors which affects the financial 
and contractual arrangements that are applicable in Finland; however, the 
situation is likely to change in year 1999; 
- 	Only pure project company arrangements will guarantee that major project 
risks are transferred to private sector; 
- 	Only project company arrangements will result in a financial transparency 
of operations; 
- 	Other than single project company arrangements are more simple, and 
easier to implement; 
- 	Whichever alternative is chosen, it has to be fine-tuned for the particular 
project. 
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6 	CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There are no "good" or "bad" solutions in rail project financing  - there are only solu-
tions that are accepted by different parties involved and furthermore, accepted polit-
ically as well. It is the perception of the author, that extensive discussion and evalua-
tion of the possibilities of private finance is needed in this country. Private financing 
has, no doubt, also ideological aspects which affect the society as a whole. On the 
other hand, if good service at a fair price is provided to consumers after their demand, 
and if wide socio-economic benefits exist as well, the nature of capital employed 
would seem to be an issue of less significance. 
As for Finnish context, the author believes that single-project company models are 
worth serious consideration. The arrangement provides possibilities of enhanced com-
petition within the industry, as other operators and investors in addition to VR may be 
interested in the project. It also offers prospects of privatising a part of the infrastruc-
ture, if this is preferred by the society. Project company models should also empha-
sise the role of rail authority as guardian of performance of concessionaires,  ie both 
the quality of transport services and quality of construction and maintenance works. 
If it is preferred that VR maintains its monopoly position as a state-owned company, 
 VR's  interest in investing in rail infrastructure should be encouraged. However, it is
noteworthy that this will further strengthen  VR's position in rail transport market. 
Finally, the possibilities of participating in Eastern Europe's railway markets are a 
great challenge to Finnish investors, who could co-operate with other international in-
vestors. For example, in Russia there are numerous projects with promising cash flow 
projections if Russia's political and economic development is favourable. The 
author feels that unless there is Finnish expertise gained in domestic projects, these 
possibilities abroad are beyond the reach of the Finns. Assuming that the rail infra-
structure is to be privatised as well, meaning that  RHK is sold to private investors or to 
its present managers, the possibilities of investment operations to foreign countries 
are even more important. 
Both politicians and authorities would probably feel more comfortable if clear national 
strategy and guidelines for rail and other infrastructure financing would exist. This ap-
plies to investments both in the home country and foreign countries.  
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